US Critical Mineral Policy and Germanium

Over the past decade, the United States has built an increasingly comprehensive federal policy framework for critical mineral supply security. For germanium, this framework spans executive orders identifying it as a critical material, legislation funding domestic production and stockpiling, and agency programs deploying those authorities. This page maps the full landscape of US policy actions relevant to germanium supply.

2017
First Federal Critical Minerals EO
35
Minerals on US Critical Minerals List
8
Federal Agencies with Germanium Roles
NDS
National Defense Stockpile Active for Germanium

Overview of US Critical Mineral Policy

The United States government has developed a multi-layered framework for addressing critical mineral supply vulnerabilities over the past decade. This framework includes executive orders directing agencies to assess and address supply risks, legislation providing funding for domestic production and stockpiling, and interagency programs coordinating activities across departments. Germanium is explicitly named in multiple executive orders and legislative provisions as a priority material.

The US approach differs from the EU's Critical Raw Materials Act in that it is less centrally coordinated and relies more heavily on market incentives, defense procurement authorities, and bilateral allied partnerships rather than regulatory mandates. This approach offers flexibility but can result in less consistent implementation across agencies and administrations.

Bipartisan Policy Continuity

Critical mineral security policy has maintained notable bipartisan continuity. Executive Orders 13817 (Trump, 2017), 13953 (Trump, 2020), and 14017 (Biden, 2021) all identified germanium as a critical material and directed agency action. The CHIPS Act (2022) and related legislation passed with bipartisan support. This continuity reflects genuine consensus that critical mineral supply vulnerability is a national security issue that transcends partisan politics.

US Germanium Policy Timeline

US Critical Mineral and Germanium Policy: Key Milestones 2017-2024

2017

EO 13817: The First Federal Critical Minerals Strategy

President Trump signed EO 13817, directing the Interior Department to produce a list of critical minerals essential to national security and economic prosperity. Germanium was on the first published list of 35 critical minerals. The order required agencies to assess vulnerabilities and develop strategies to address them.

2020

EO 13953: Supply Chain Orders Expanded

EO 13953 directed the DoD and Commerce Department to identify supply chain vulnerabilities for critical minerals, assess foreign dependency risks, and propose remediation strategies including DPA Title III investments and stockpile expansion. This order specifically flagged germanium, gallium, and rare earths as priority materials.

2021

EO 14017: 100-Day Supply Chain Review

President Biden's EO 14017 ordered a comprehensive 100-day supply chain review for critical sectors including semiconductors, batteries, and defense materials. The resulting report explicitly identified germanium as a vulnerability requiring immediate action, recommending DPA investments, allied partnerships, and stockpile expansion.

2022

CHIPS Act and IRA: Structural Policy Response

The CHIPS and Science Act provided $280 billion for domestic semiconductor manufacturing and research, with provisions addressing material supply chains including germanium substrates. The Inflation Reduction Act created demand incentives for critical mineral supply chains through EV tax credit content requirements.

2023

China Export Controls: Policy Response Activated

Following China's August 2023 germanium controls, the DoD accelerated DPA Title III funding, the DLA expanded stockpile purchases, and Congress added specific germanium supply chain provisions to the FY2024 NDAA. The export controls transformed germanium policy from precautionary to emergency mode.

2024

NDAA and DLA Procurement Authorization

The FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act included provisions directing DLA to accelerate germanium stockpile purchases, restricting DoD procurement of germanium from certain foreign adversary sources, and requiring annual reporting on critical mineral stockpile adequacy to Congress.

Key Legislation and Executive Orders

US Federal Legislation and Executive Orders Affecting Germanium Supply Security

Legislation / EO
Year
Lead Agency
Germanium Relevance
National Defense Stockpile Act1979DLAAuthorizes strategic germanium reserves; basis for DLA procurement
EO 13817: Federal Strategy for Critical Minerals2017Interior / DoDIdentified germanium as critical; triggered supply chain assessment
EO 13953: Critical Minerals Supply Chains2020DoD / CommerceRequired DoD to identify germanium substitution and domestic options
EO 14017: Americas Supply Chains2021NSC / CommerceMandated 100-day supply chain review including germanium
CHIPS and Science Act2022Commerce / DoDFunds Ge substrate manufacturing; addresses semiconductor material dependency
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)2022Treasury / DoECritical mineral content requirements for EV tax credits drive Ge demand
DPA Title III Critical Minerals2022DoDFunds domestic Ge recovery capacity and strategic stockpile purchases
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)2023-2024DoD / DLADirects DLA stockpile expansion; restricts certain Chinese mineral purchases

Source: Federal Register; Congressional Research Service; DoD Industrial Base Policy reports

Key Federal Agencies and Their Germanium Roles

Federal Agencies with Material Roles in US Germanium Supply Security Policy

Agency
Role in Germanium Policy
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)Manages National Defense Stockpile; primary government buyer of germanium
DoD Industrial Base PolicyDPA Title III program administration; identifies defense-critical materials
DARPAFunds research on Ge substrate alternatives and IR optic efficiency improvements
USGSPublishes annual Mineral Commodity Summaries; tracks global Ge production and trade
Commerce / BISAdministers US export controls; identifies supply chain vulnerabilities
State Department / DFCMineral Security Partnership coordination; allied-nation co-investment
DoE / EEREFunds critical mineral recycling and processing research including Ge recovery
NSCCoordinates interagency critical mineral strategy; principal-level policy decisions

Source: Agency websites; DoD Industrial Base Policy; DLA official materials

Policy Gaps and Ongoing Challenges

Despite significant policy activity, several gaps in the US germanium security framework remain. The most significant is the lack of a domestic primary germanium production base. US zinc smelting capacity is insufficient to provide meaningful domestic germanium supply, and no major new zinc smelting investments are planned. This means the US will remain dependent on allied-nation supply (primarily Belgium and Canada) rather than achieving true supply independence.

A second gap is in classified stockpile adequacy. Multiple Government Accountability Office reports have identified shortfalls in National Defense Stockpile quantities relative to DoD-established requirements for defense-critical materials including germanium. Closing these gaps requires sustained procurement funding above recent appropriation levels.

Finally, interagency coordination remains imperfect. Multiple agencies have overlapping authorities and funding streams for germanium-related programs, and a clearly designated lead agency or coordinator for the full germanium supply chain security mission does not exist. The NSC's critical minerals directorate provides some coordination, but operational implementation remains fragmented.

Frequently Asked Questions

Yes. Germanium appears on the official US Critical Minerals List published by the US Geological Survey, which is updated periodically based on supply concentration, import dependence, and economic and defense importance. Germanium has been on the list since its first publication following EO 13817 in 2017 and has maintained its listing through subsequent updates.
The CHIPS and Science Act addresses germanium primarily through two channels. First, Section 9902 provides grants for semiconductor supply chain investments including materials, and germanium substrates for compound semiconductor applications qualify. Second, the broader CHIPS Act investment in domestic semiconductor manufacturing creates demand for germanium-containing components that incentivizes supply investment. DARPA's CHIPS-funded programs also include research on germanium substrate manufacturing.
The US has not imposed specific export controls on germanium products exported to China, and such controls would be unusual given that the US is a net importer of germanium. However, the US has broader authorities under the Export Administration Regulations and DPA to restrict exports of technology and equipment used in germanium processing if national security grounds are identified. The more likely US response to Chinese mineral controls is through procurement policy, allied partnerships, and investment programs rather than reciprocal material export controls.
The US approach is more defense-centric than the EU's, reflecting the dominant role of DoD in driving germanium demand and policy. The EU's Critical Raw Materials Act takes a broader industrial policy approach, addressing supply security for commercial and defense applications jointly. Japan's approach is the most focused on recycling and efficiency, reflecting limited domestic mineral resources. All three approaches are complementary and increasingly coordinated through the Mineral Security Partnership.

Related Geopolitics Topics

Elena Vasquez

M.A. International Security, Georgetown University

Geopolitical Analyst at Invest In Germanium